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COMPARATIVE LEGAL CULTURAL ANALYSES OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW: A NEW METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH
Colin B. Picker

Abstract--The effective development and operation of the law faces many obstacles.
Among the more intractable yet hidden barriers to the law are legal cultural disconnects
and discontinuities. These occur when opposing legal cultural characteristics from
different legal cultures are forced to interact as part of the implementation of the law
across two different legal cultures. That conflictual interaction can impede or block the
success of that law. While present in domestic legal systems, those conflicts are more
likely and the conflicts may be deeper between the many different legal cultures involved
in the international legal order. Identification of such legal cultural disconnects and
discontinuities is the first step towards developing strategies to ameliorate potential
conflicts between opposing legal cultural characteristics. That identification requires
examination of the relevant legal systems with legal culture in mind—a legal cultural
analysis. But, that methodology is rarely employed. To the extent we do see legal
cultural analyses, they are applied almost exclusively in the domestic arena. When it is
applied across legal systems it becomes a part of comparative law methodology. This
merger of comparative law and legal cultural approaches is unusual, indeed almost
unheard of in the international legal arena. This article explores that methodology, to
argue that it is possible and valuable.
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I. INTRODUCTION
International economic law (“IEL”) has come of age: it is almost seventy years since the
birth of the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) and the World Bank; the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) has now existed for almost two decades; and in recent years there
have been thousands of bilateral investment treaties and hundreds of preferential trade
agreements launched. Furthermore, there are now countless books, articles, reports,
institutions, and specialized degrees in the field to attest to IEL’s maturity. Yet, like
much of international law, IEL has traditionally been analysed through conventional
research methodologies. Given the level of maturity of the field it is now time that it is
examined more vigorously under innovative and alternative methodologies. In the
increasingly complex and novel arenas in which the field now finds itself, those nontraditional methodological approaches could assist researchers in teasing out deeper
levels of understandings of the field in order to help it to develop and serve its
constituents. As such, this article presents the case for the application to IEL of such a
novel methodology—comparative legal cultural analysis.
Among the more intractable and hidden barriers to IEL are legal cultural disconnects and
discontinuities, obstacles that would be amenable to comparative legal cultural analyses.
Legal cultural disconnects and discontinuities occur when opposing legal cultural
characteristics from different legal cultures are forced to interact as part of the
implementation of the law across two different legal cultures. While present in domestic
legal systems, those conflicts are more likely and the conflicts may be deeper between the
many different legal cultures involved in the international legal order. For example, legal
cultural conflict is likely to arise in the interaction between traditional indigenous
knowledge and the international intellectual property regimes. That discord may surface
from, among other issues, the potential disconnect between the individualism present
within the legal culture of international intellectual property and the collectivism found
within many indigenous legal cultures.1 Identification of the relevant legal cultural
characteristics can then permit solutions to be devised, permitting a more successful
interaction between the participants from the different legal cultures.
Identification of such legal cultural disconnects and discontinuities is the first step
towards developing strategies to ameliorate potential conflicts between opposing legal
cultural characteristics. That identification requires examination of the relevant
competing legal systems with legal culture in mind—a comparative legal cultural
analysis. To the extent we do see legal cultural analyses, it is applied almost exclusively
in the domestic arena. When it is applied across legal systems it becomes a part of
comparative law methodology. But this merger of comparative law and legal cultural
approaches is unusual, indeed almost unheard of in the IEL context. Nonetheless, this
article will build the case for its application outside the domestic legal order and
specifically for its utility in examinations of IEL.

1

See, e.g., Lorie Graham & Stephen McJohn, ‘Indigenous Peoples and Intellectual Property’, (2005) 19 Washington
UJL & Policy 313-337.
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Of course, any discussion of methodology takes place against the background that
methodology in legal scholarship is both too little explored and an awkward area.2 Too
often legal scholars simply “do” research without careful consideration of
methodologies.3 Unlike the social sciences or many other intellectual fields,
methodology is significantly missing as an explicit matter from much legal scholarship.
It is often absent in the publications, frequently not receiving any mention at all, and it is
seldom explicitly discussed by legal researchers.4 All too typically, legal researchers
only confront legal research methodology when they do interdisciplinary work and the
non-law participants press them for an explanation of the research methodology. When
law scholars apply for grants they may also be asked for an explanation of their proposed
research methodology.5 Such requests are often viewed with dread by legal researchers
who then struggle to explain their methodology in an acceptable manner.
Comparative law, however, is one of the few areas of legal scholarship where
methodology is regularly discussed and arguably constitutes a significant portion of the
field. Indeed, some have considered comparative law to be merely a methodology,
though the more accepted and modern view is that in addition to providing powerful
research methodologies it also constitutes a field with substantive content.6 But, as
discussed below, comparative law methodologies are almost exclusively applied to
domestic law systems and are infrequently applied to international or transnational legal
systems or institutions, especially not to IEL fields. Furthermore, for the reasons
discussed below, on those rare occasions when comparative law is applied to the
international legal order, though still producing useful results, it is typically applied in a
limited manner.7 Rarely is a complete or holistic comparative analysis performed.
2

While not the subject of this thesis, the reasons for the dearth of explicit methodological concern in legal research are
not entirely understood, but thought to be connected to beliefs that: legal education typical fails to teach research
methodology, beyond that required for the practice of law; law, in the common law world in particular, is less
intellectually rigorous than other social science fields; the traditional sources of legal research (cases, statutes, etc) may
not require complex methodological approaches; the supremacy of doctrinal research has stifled development of
research methodological capability by researchers; and so on. This issue is presently the subject of research by the
author, see also note 4 below. See also Section III.
3

A recent UNSW Law Faculty research seminar, held 26 June 2012, focused on the question “Should legal scholars
worry about research methodology?”. The view that much legal research does not include consideration of research
methdoology was one expressed by many of the academics present.
4

Idibid.

5

See, e.g., Australian Research Council Discovery – Instructions to Applicants for funding commencing in 2013, at 16,
available at http://www.arc.gov.au/ncgp/dp/dp_instructions.htm (last accessed 11 January 2013).
6

See generally, Mathias Reimann, ‘The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the Twentieth
Century’, (2002) 50 American J Comparative L 671-700 (hereinafter “Reimann (Comparative Law)”).
7

Typically the few analyses that exist deal with quite specific issues, such as international criminal law, and in
particular the International Criminal Court. See, e.g., Leila Nadya Sadat, ‘The Nuremberg Paradox’, (2010) 58
American J Comparative L 151-204; Robert Christensen, ‘Getting to Peace by Reconciling Notions of Justice: The
Importance of Considering Discrepancies Between Civil and Common Legal Systems in the Formation of the
International Criminal Court’, (2002) 6 UCLA J. Intl L & Foreign Affairs 391-423; see also Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks,
‘The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the “Rule Of Law”’, (2003) 101 Michigan LR 2275-2340. Though, there
are a few examples of the merger of comparative and international law. See, e.g., Mark W. Janis, ‘Remark,
Comparative Approaches to the Theory of International Law’, (1986) 80 ASIL Procedings 152-175; David Kennedy,
‘New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International Governance’, (1997) Utah LR 545-637;
William E. Butler, ‘International Law and the Comparative Method’, in William E. Butler (ed.), International Law In
Comparative Perspective (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn and Germantown, Maryland 1980) 25-40 . The
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Furthermore, a contextual comparative analysis, such as a comparative legal cultural
analysis, is almost never undertaken. This article will refute the reasons and obstacles that
stand in the way of comparative analyses of international law fields.
The article will first lay out the primary relevant methodological approaches for both
international economic law and comparative law. The article will then present the
proposed methodology, comparative legal cultural analysis, in the process necessarily
first providing detailed consideration of the difficult concept of legal culture itself.
Finally, the article will bring together these different methodological approaches as it
argues for the employment of a comparative legal cultural analysis of international
economic law. Given the constraints of a journal article, this article cannot provide
detailed application of the methodology. However, it should be noted that direct
application of the methodology has already been undertaken in a series of specific, but
necessarily brief, case studies that have been very recently published or are shortly to
appear in print.8 Because those case studies focus on the direct implementations of the
methodology there is correspondingly significantly less discussion of the background and
bases of the methodology as are provided in this article.

II. INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES
International economic law as a field is relatively new.9 Indeed, it is so new that it at
times still faces existential challenges.10 While the individual components, such as trade,
investment and finance, have been the subject of research for a long time, it is only in the
last few decades that there has been vigorous and sustained research into these areas as
individual parts of a connected field, each with their own, yet related, internal orders and

fact that one can list the primary examples within a footnote supports the assertion that it is a little used and developed
methodology.
8

Colin B. Picker, ‘A Framework for Comparative Analyses of International Law and its Institutions: Using the
Example of the World Trade Organization’, in Eleanor Cashin Ritaine , Seán Patrick Donlan & Martin Sychold (eds.),
Comparative Law And Hybrid Legal Systems (Publicationof Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, 2010) (hereinafter
“Picker (WTO)”); Colin B. Picker, ‘Comparative Law Methodology & American Legal Culture: Obstacles And
Opportunities’, (2011) 16 Roger Williams ULR 86-99 (hereinafter “Picker (RWU)”); Colin B. Picker, ‘WTO
Governance: A Legal Cultural Critique’, in Kenji Hirashima (ed.), Governance In Contemporary Japan (Publication of
University of Tokyo Institute Social Science, 2011) 103-124,; Colin B. Picker, ‘International Trade and Development
Law: A Legal Cultural Critique’, (2011) 4(2) Law & Development Review 43-71; Colin B. Picker, ‘China, Global
Governance & Legal Culture’, in Junji Nakagaw (ed.), China And Global Economic Governance: Ideas And Concepts
(ISS Research Series No.45, Tokyo: Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo., 2011) (hereinafter “Picker
(China)”); Colin B. Picker, ‘A Legal Cultural Analysis of Microtrade’, (2012) 5(1) Law & Development Review 101128; Colin B. Picker, ‘Anti-Poverty v. The International Economic Legal Order? A Legal Cultural Critique’ in Krista
Shefer (ed.), Poverty & The International Economic Law System (CUP, Cambridge 2013) (forthcoming); Colin B.
Picker, ‘Chapter 6, Microtrade and Legal Cultural Considerations’ in Yong-Shik Lee (ed.), Microtrade: A New System
Of International Trade With Volunteerism Towards Poverty Elimination (Routledge, 2013) (forthcoming).
9

See generally Detlev F. Vagts, ‘International Economic Law and the American Journal of International Law’, (2006)
100 AJIL 769-782(citations omitted).
10

See Steve Charnovitz, ‘What is International Economic Law?’, (2011) 3 J Intl Economic L 3-22 (“I have not been
able to find even two definitions that match.”).
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approaches.11 Though, as such a new field, the exact contours and characteristics remain
contentious and hidden, with very different views on what should be included within the
field. Detlev Vagts notes:
‘[IEL’s] scope is controversial. According to one definition, it encompasses “the
total range of norms (directly or indirectly based on treaties) of public
international law with regard to transnational economic relations.” A wide variety
of international law rules have been said to have a financial impact somewhere.
For practical purposes, . . . I define international economic law as the international
law regulating transborder transactions in goods, services, currency, investment,
and intellectual property. I exclude from the inquiry issues of private international
law, as well as of economic warfare.’12
This article does not need to engage in the debate about the definition of the field, though
those parts of IEL covered in this article do in fact conform to Vagts’ definition of IEL.
Like public international law, which is considered to have an insufficient understanding
of its theoretical and methodological bases,13 there is little agreement or understanding
and, until recently,14 little work on innovative and novel IEL research methodologies. In
part this is because IEL researchers would rather spend time discussing and presenting
the results of their work, not how they researched those results. Thus, aside from the
recent attention given to empirical methodologies,15 it is hard to persuade IEL academics
to organize or take part in workshops or conference panels on methodological
approaches.16 Nonetheless, occasionally a conference or book will buck the trend and
delve into IEL methodology. One of the more accessible and holistic discussions on the
subject are the works of Tomer Broude, Gregory Shaffer and Joel Trachtman presented at
a conference that was organized with the explicit goal of seeking clarity on and
understanding of the field of IEL as a whole.17 The products of that conference were then
published in an edited collection.18 While other works exist, they are less precisely
11

Tomer Broude, ‘At the End of the Yellow Brick Road’, in Colin B. Picker, Isabella D. Bunn & Douglas W Arner
(eds.), International Economic Law: The State and Future of the Discipline (2008) 15-28, 15.
12

Vagts （fn 9） 769.

13

Joel P. Trachtman, ‘International Economic Law Research: A Taxonomy’ in Colin B. Picker, Isabella D. Bunn &
Douglas Arner (eds.), International Economic Law-The State and Future of the Discipline (Hart, Portland 2008) 43-52,
45.
14

See, e.g., Amalya Perry-Kessaris (ed.), Socio-legal Approaches to International Economic Law: Text, Context,
Subtext , (Routledge, London December 2012).
15

See, e.g., Susan Franck, ‘Empiricism & International Law’, (2008) 48 Virginia J Intl L 767-815.

16

My experience as an organizer of numerous local, regional and global IEL conferences over the last decade has
consistently found that formal discussion of methodology and teaching are typically eschewed by the vast bulk of
researchers within the field.
17

The American Society of International Law - IEL Group, Annual Conference: International Economic Law – The
State and Future of the Discipline (9 November to 12November, 2006, held at the historic Mount Washington Resort at
Bretton Woods, New Hampshire—birthplace of the IMF and World Bank).
18

Colin B. Picker, Isabella D. Bunn & Douglas Arner (eds.), International Economic Law - The State & Future of the
Discipline (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2008).
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focused on the methodology of the entire field.19 As such, the work of Broude, Shaffer
and Trachtman that appear in that edited volume will be the primary sources here for this
article’s overview of IEL research methodologies.
The “bedrock” of IEL research methodology is traditional doctrinal analysis.20 As
Trachtman notes, this reflects the practice orientation of legal education, “because
practicing lawyers need not often argue about what the law should be, but are more
concerned with what the law is, theory and methodology are unimportant.”21 Though, to
the extent theory is present, it is a form of liberal economic theory, but then that theory is
itself converted into “hard-nosed practical formulas” of the sort on which doctrinal
analysis thrives.22 Broude, in discussing the continued relevance of this form of
scholarship, even critiqued his own earlier work that employed that methodology as
“ostrich-like, self centred, technical and legalistic”.
Of course, other methodological research approaches do exist. Shaffer has argued that
some of the other approaches in IEL research include “normative advocacy”, “theoretical
exposition” and empirical approaches.23 While empirical approaches are well understood
and will not be further discussed or defined here, resort to Shaffer’s terminology on the
other two less well known descriptions is helpful. In normative advocacy
‘[a]uthors writing in a normative vein typically advance a particular normative
goal and then address how the institution, treaty or case law needs to be reformed,
revised or interpreted to advance that normative goal. . . . The distinction of
normative scholarship is that it explicitly aims to be transformative, while
traditional legal formalist scholarship aims to be objective, purporting to describe
law in neutral terms.’24
In theoretical exposition “the scholarship does not constitute theory in a positivist sense
in which theory signifies the making of propositions (or axioms) that can be tested and
refuted, but rather puts forward a positive or normative analytic framework for
understanding law.”25 Shaffer’s terminology is not exhaustive, with others describing
similar approaches under different terms. Indeed, throughout legal methodological
19

See, e.g., Issue 2, of (1994-95) 10 American J Intl l & Policy 595-992, comprising a series of articles from a
conference on Interdisciplinary Approaches to International Economic Law.
20

Gregory Shaffer, ‘A New Legal Realism: Method in International Economic Law Scholarship’ in Colin B. Picker,
Isabella D. Bunn and Douglas Arner (eds.), International Economic Law-The State and Future of the Discipline (Hart,
Portland 2008) 29-42, 30; Broude (fn 11) 24.
21

Trachtman (fn 13) 46.

22

Broude (fn 11) at 19.

23

Shaffer (fn20) 31-33. Trachtman would have defined the range of methodologies somewhat differently, though in the
main does not depart too far from those discussed by Shaffer above. The one exception, not relevant to the
methodology at issue in this article, being Trachtman’s greater discussion of the methodologies associated with public
chocie theory, including law and economics. See Trachtman (fn13) 49.
24

Shaffer (fn20) 31.

25

ibid.
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discussions one can find a proliferation of terms, with the taxonomy being confusing and
suggestive of a plethora of approaches. Yet they often overlap or duplicate with other
supposedly different methodological approaches.26 Nonetheless, Shaffer’s terms are
sufficient here, especially given their relevance to the methodology at issue in this article.
Therefore, staying within his taxonomy, it can be said that doctrinal analysis remains the
overarching approach for IEL, often supplemented by normative advocacy and
qualitative or quantitative empirical research, yet with a theoretical framework likely
included.
Of direct relevance to this article, Shaffer then strongly argues for a “new legal realist”
approach which he claims would provide important insights into IEL—it “builds from the
socio-legal tradition of ‘law and society’ to engage in actual empirical work.”27 At times
the exact content of that approach overlaps with the comparative legal cultural
methodology discussed in this article. But, unlike comparative legal cultural analysis it
does not employ comparative methodological techniques and approaches. Nonetheless,
Shaffer does notes the vital role of legal culture in creating the legal reality central to his
methodology. As an IEL scholar he even uses the World Trade Organization as an
example for his proposal:
‘[W]TO law does not exist in a separate, autonomous sphere—such as in the
treaty texts or in the Appellate Body’s adopted decisions—but operates within
particular legal cultures in which these texts and decisions play a part. These legal
cultures include the interaction of the WTO judicial process with those who bring
arguments to it, on the one hand, and the national institutions and “civil society”
to whom the judicial decisions are addressed, on the other.’28
Shaffer’s proposal is not the same as that presented in this article. In significant part
because it does not delve deeply into the inevitable legal cultural clashes and disconnects.
Nor does it employ comparative law to the extent found in the comparative legal cultural
analysis proffered in this article. His suggestion nonetheless provides support for the idea
that methodologies along his approach and that discussed in this proposal are legitimate
methodologies for research in IEL. Indeed, Broude and others have argued for the
employment of different and alternative approaches.29 Trachtman even argues that IEL
researchers should go off in new directions specifically based on a better understanding
of the many different and possible research methodologies:
‘[w]e . . . should recognize where our collective knowledge of a particular
problem is adequate. One of the pathologies of IEL research, as of other law
research, is to cover again ground that has already been covered. Greater
understanding of, and agreement on, research methodology will allow us to form
26

ibid 41.

27

ibid 38. While I have not had the chance to read it yet, a new book edited by Amanda Perry-Kessaris looks to be on
point. See Perry-Kessaris (fn 14).
28

ibid at 40.

29

Broude (fn 11) 25-26.
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a consensus that certain issues are adequately known, and to go on to unknown
issues.’30
That includes consideration of methodologies employed by non-law disciplines, though,
Broude in particular notes that we risk leaving the law behind when we delve into nonlaw methodologies and are no longer “being jurists”.31 Thus, some efforts, such as those
employing institutionalism,32 may be viewed as straying out of law and into sociology or
other disciplines, though, of course, may still provide useful insights. But, comparative
legal methodologies, as employed in this article, are firmly within the law and permit us
to stay solidly on safe ground, even as they answer the challenge posed by the failures or
inadequacies of traditional methodologies.
III. COMPARATIVE LAW RESEARCH METHODOLOGIES
Given that the methodology proposed in this article is drawn from and employs
comparative methodologies, this section lays out the relevant foundations of comparative
methodology. Furthermore, despite the lack of comparative law methodology in
international law research, it is one of the central components in the intellectual inquiry
into the law and as such will frequently be present even in methodologies that do not
explicitly refer to it. Indeed, comparative law has played a critical role in the
development of the law from ancient to modern times. Reputedly, Aristotle and Solon
engaged in comparative consideration of other city-states’ laws as they developed their
theories on constitutions and law.33 More recently, the drafting of the Australian
constitution at the end of the nineteenth century benefited from comparative
considerations of other constitutions, such as that of the United States.34 In addition to
helping develop the law, comparative law also permits greater understanding of one’s
own law, through reflection and understanding of other legal systems.35 But, the use of
foreign systems as models or for self reflection cannot take place without
methodologically appropriate examinations of those foreign legal systems. Comparative
law methodology is the decisive tool in those efforts.
There is, of course, no “one” comparative law methodology. Indeed, there are numerous,
sometimes contradictory, methodologies—from functionalism to the post modern
30

Trachtman (fn 13) 43.

31

Broude (fn 11) 26.

32

See, e.g., Philip. M. Nichols, ‘Forgotten Linkages-Historical Institutionalism and Sociological Institutionalism and
Analysis of the World Trade Organization’, (1998) 19(2) U Pennsylvania J Intl Economic L 461-511; Andrew T.F.
Lang, ‘Some Sociological Perspectives on International Institutions and the Trading System’, in Colin B. Picker,
Isabella D. Bunn & Douglas Arner (eds.), International Economic Law - The State & Future of the Discipline (Hart
Publishing, Oxford 2008) 73-88.
33

John H. Merryman, David S. Clark, & John O. Haley, Comparative Law: Historical Development of the Civil Law
Tradition in Europe, Latin America, and East Asia (Matthew Bender 1994) 1.
34

See, e.g., William G Buss, ‘Andrew Inglis Clark's Draft Constitution, Article III of the Australian Constitution, and
the Assist from Article III of the Constitution of the United States’, (2009) 33 Melbourne ULR 718-801.
35

Vivian Grosswald Curran, ‘Cultural Immersion, Difference and Categories in U.S. Comparative Law’, (1998) 46
American J Comparative L 43-92, 46.
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contextualism to the post-post modern approaches. These different methodologies have
generated conflict and disagreement between the adherents of the different approaches.
Despite the complexities suggested by those different approaches, comparative analyses
are something humans perform numerous times a day, albeit usually subconsciously. 36
After all, when considering the differences between two people, we take into account the
visible differences as well as their different abilities and characteristics—which in
simplified form constitute the essential approaches of comparative analyses. But, even
though it is an innate ability, a more formal consideration and application of the process
both deserves attention and will improve any comparative analyses,37 no matter how
basic.
One of the primary comparative law methods is “functionalism”—which argues that
comparisons only make sense when what are being compared are functionally
equivalent.38 In other words, that the legal issues compared are designed to address
similar legal problems, regardless of differing names or other external characteristics.39
For example, the concept of third party participation in WTO litigation, through its use of
the phrase “third party” may incorrectly suggest the rights, liabilities and procedures that
exist with respect to third party defendants or complainants in domestic litigations.40 In
some respects, functionalism addresses one of the more common comparative analytic
errors, which is to compare things that appear similar but actually have different
functions within the legal system.
It is especially difficult when working across legal systems that require linguistic and
cultural translation as well as legal translation to ensure that comparable legal issues and
problems are in fact being compared.41 Of course, aside from linguistic difficulties it can
be hard to know truly whether things are similar or different, for the divergence between
the comparables may only appear when each is combined or employed with another legal
device. In other words, the function may only be understood in the context of the
complete legal system or field within which it operates. Functionalism thus forms the
backdrop against which comparative legal cultural analysis takes place. Thus, for
example, in a comparative legal cultural analysis of governance at the WTO, an implicit
36

The above discussion on comparative law methodologies in general is drawn from Colin B. Picker, ‘Comparative
Civil Procedure: Opportunities and Pitfalls’, in Michael Legg (ed.), The Future of Dispute Resolution (LexisNexis
Butterworths, Australia 2012) 247-256.
37

Other non-functionalism errors and pitfalls that may ensue from comparative analyses are discussed in Colin B.
Picker, Article 2, ‘An Introduction to Comparative Analyses of International Organizations’, in Lukas Heckendorn &
Colin Picker (eds.), Comparative Law and International Organizations: Cooperation, Competition And Connections
(Publ. Of Swiss Institute of Comparative Law2013) (forthcoming) (hereinafter “Picker (IOs)”).
38

See generally, Ralf Michaels, ‘The Functionalist Method of Comparative Law’, in Mathias Reimann & Reinhard
Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP, Oxford 2006) 339.
39

W. J. Kamba, ‘Comparative Law: A Theoretical Framework’, (1974) 23 ICLQ 485-519, 517.

40

See, e.g., Xiaoming Pan, ‘Developing Countries Participating As Third Parties in the WTO Dispute Settlement’
(paper on file with author, presented at the Second Asia IEL Network Conference July 2011, University of Hong Kong
Law Faculty) (suprisingly, the issue of third party rights in the WTO has received scant attention from scholars).
41

See Curran (fn 35) 50 (1998); see also Janet E. Ainsworth, ‘Categories and Culture: on the “Rectification of Names”
in Comparative Law’, (1996) 82 Cornell LR 19-42.
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functionalist analysis will take place permitting the discussion of “governance” to take
place across different legal systems—from domestic to that of the WTO.
Common errors in functional analyses occur when there is a failure to understand:
That a foreign law may have no tangible function (it may be enacted for symbolic
reasons)42;
That the function no longer continues to exist43;
That the function is not as anticipated or has changed44;
That the function is supplanted by an overarching ideology that supplants the
legal issue45;
That there may be many different functions46.
In other words, functionalism can too easily be ethnocentric, viewing foreign legal issues
through parochial lens. This is manifested in the basic expectation that functions can be
similar and that problems in different legal systems are the same, felt the same, or
understood the same way.47 In a comparative legal cultural analysis one would expect
that the enhanced sensitivities should preclude such errors, but noting the common
pitfalls can ensure the functional analysis is not inherently flawed.
Of course, there is no question that functionalism and the other comparative law
methodologies engage in simplifications a great deal of the time. But, that is the norm in
comparative law.48 Nonetheless, comparative law methodologies can be quite
sophisticated and like all fields, comparative law and its methodologies continue to
develop in ever more sophisticated and complex ways. The development of comparative
law methodologies does not, of course, take place in a vacuum. Changes within the
larger world of the law away from doctrinal rules and towards legal realism contributed
to the move within comparative law away from traditional approaches, even when they
were not incompatible, towards consideration of such new approaches as legal culture. 49
Accordingly, and developed in some measure in response to comparative law’s
42

See Oliver Brand, ‘Conceptual Comparisons: Towards a Coherent Methodology of Comparative Legal Studies’,
(2007) 32 Brooklyn J Intl L 405-466, 415.
43

ibid 419-20.

44

See Christopher A. Whytock, ‘Legal Origins, Functionalism, and the Future of Comparative Law’, (2009) BYU LR
1879-1906, 1890.
45

See Brand (fn 42) 455.

46

ibid 416.

47

See Anne Peters & Heiner Schwenke, ‘Comparative Law Beyond Post-Modernism’, (2000) 49 ICLQ 800-834, 820.

48

See Reimann (Comparative Law) (fn 6) 677. (“First, it is understood today that all classifications are mere
approximations to, not accurate reflections of, reality. We mostly continue to divide the world into civil law, common
law, and several other systems but we know that these are ideal types which merely serve our need to maintain a rough
overview.”)
49

“Traditionally, the autonomy of the discipline of legal studies was located within the doctrinal rules, which were
thought to be capable of generating solutions to every actual controversy.” Paul W. Kahn, ‘Freedom, Autonomy and
the Cultural Study of the Law’, in Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon (eds.), Cultural Analysis, Clutural Studies and the
Law: Moving Beyond Legal Realism (Duke University Press, Durham and London 2003) 154-190, 155-56.
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traditional reliance on functionalism, comparative analyses increasingly focused on the
comparative context—comparative contextualism.50
Contextualism is easily explained by considering that archetype of comparison—“apples
and oranges”. The differences between these fruits are vast, or so they appear in our
ordinary life and use of those fruits. One is green or red, the other is orange; one is citrus
the other is sweet; one needs to be peeled, the other has edible skin; one can be baked
into a pie, the other can be preserved as a marmalade; one grows in semi-tropical
climates, the other in colder regions; and so on. Those differences certainly suggest the
two are not comparable—as is suggested by the traditional phrase. But, both are fruits,
both are healthy snacks, both cost roughly the same, both are easily available in stores,
and from a scientific perspective, they are almost indistinguishable.51 In those senses,
they are similar. So, in addition to consideration of their function, their comparability
depends on the context in which the comparison is being made—whether in the context
of taste or cultivation.
For IEL, the contexts that are, as an initial matter, critical for comparative consideration
are the institutional, constitutional, historical, political, and sometimes sociological and
legal cultural contexts. Thus, the context of IEL must include not only what is written
down, but as it is applied and as it is informed by history and the institutions within
which it operates. Specifically, as argued in this article, IEL’s context must also include
consideration of the relevant and competing legal cultures—those of the international
field, the international institutions and organizations, and those of the different domestic
legal systems and communities involved in the IEL. Comparative legal cultural analyses
are thus critical to understanding IEL’s context.
IV. LEGAL CULTURE
Before discussing comparative legal cultural analysis, the concept of legal culture itself
must first be explored and explained—to the extent such an amorphous concept can be
explained.
The relationship between law and culture has been the subject of inquiry and discussion
for centuries:
‘[Nineteenth century] scholars such as Maine and Savigny attributed the
brilliance of Roman law to the fact that, for whatever reason, Roman culture

50
51

Peters & Schwenke (fn 47) 827.

See Scott A. Sanford, ‘Apples and Oranges--A Comparison’, 1 Annals of Improbable Research, May/June 1995,
available at http:// www.improbable.com/airchives/paperair/volume1/v1i3/air-1-3-apples.html (last accessed 11 January
2013) (scientifically “apples and oranges are very similar”); see also Catherine Valcke, ‘Comparative Law as
Comparative Jurisprudence--The Comparability of Legal Systems’, (2004) 52 American J Comparative L 713-740, 720
(noting the comparability of apples and oranges in the context of comparing legal systems).
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glorified jurists who, for a long period of time, were dedicated to the aim of
continually improving Rome's legal institutions.’ 52
Similarly, legal culture is apparent in Montesquieu’s eighteenth century declaration in De
l'Esprit des Lois where he claimed that law depended on “local conditions”.53 Also, as an
expression of the role of legal culture, the highly influential nineteenth century German
historical school:
‘[C]onsidered law to be the manifestation of the people's national spirit
("Volksgeist") and thereby particular to every nation--an organic product of
society which has to be watched for and discovered, rather than made or tampered
with.’54
Nonetheless, despite its solid heritage, legal culture is an elusive concept.55 While the
notions associated with legal culture are to some scholars vague and close to impossible
to use, they are critical and imperative for others. These differences, whether real or
imagined,56 exist despite the fact that there are no shortages of definitions of legal culture.
For example:
‘[B]y “legal culture,” we mean the patterns of order that shape people,
institutions, and the society in a jurisdiction.’57
‘[T]he most significant feature of legal cultures would be the styles of
argumentation in jurisprudence.’58

52

Kevin E. Davis and Michael J. Trebilcock, ‘The Relationship Between Law and Development: Optimists Versus
Skeptics’, (2008) 56 American J Comparative L895-946.
53

See Brand (fn 42) 430 (citing Montesquieu, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 103-05 (David Wallace Carrithers trans., U. Cal.
Press) (1977)).
54

ibid 430.

55

See Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon, ‘Cultural Analysis, Cultural Studies and the Situation of Legal Studies’, in
Austin Sarat & Jonathan Simon (eds.), Cultural Analysis, Cultural Studies, and the Law: Moving Beyond Legal Realism
(Duke University Press, Duhram and London 2003) 1-37, 12.
56

Amy Cohen reports that Peter Fitzpatrick has argued that “that many definitional debates about culture split along the
following lines: culture is claimed to be determinate, reified, and stable or foundationally indeterminate, dynamic, and
riddled with fissures and internal dissent. Fitzpatrick, however, reasons that “‘[d]espite the seeming opposition between
these [two dimensions], culture has to be in a sense both.’ He is moved to this conclusion by the myriad ways in which
people interact with their own and other ‘cultures,’ producing both consistency and change.” Amy J. Cohen, ‘Thinking
with Culture in Law and Development’, (2009) 57 Buffalo LR 511-586, 543 (quoting from a paper in Cohen’s records,
entitled Peter Fitzpatrick, Costs of Culture 1 (unpublished paper prepared for the Law and Society Annual Meeting,
Humboldt University, Berlin (28 July 2007)) and also quoting from Peter Fitzpatrick, ‘The damned word”: Culture and
its (In)compatibility with Law’, (2005) 1 LAW, CULTURE, & HUMAN 2-13, 11.
57

Bernhard Grossfeld and Edward J. Eberle, ‘Patterns of Order in Comparative Law: Discovering and Decoding
Invisible Powers’, (2003) 38 Texas Intl LJ 291-316, 292.
58

Erhard Blankenburg, ‘Patterns of Legal Culture: The Netherlands Compared to Neighboring Germany’, (1998) 46
American J Comparative L1-41, 40 (citing René David, in INTRODUCTION, II INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW (1972)).
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‘[A]nthropologists . . . interpret legal culture as a local phenomenon, shaped by
local knowledge and practice, through which symbols such as “law” or ‘court,”
understandings of “rights” and “wrongs,” and concepts of “crime,” of “normal
trouble” or of complaining and dispute take on particular, locally relevant
meanings. In an interpretive account, legal culture not only differs in different
contexts, but law is “invented”, negotiated, or “made” in local settings.’ 59
Cultural studies of the law fulfil the “need to investigate the ways in which law is
constitutive of group and individual identities and values”.60
Legal culture “refers to ideas, values, expectations and attitudes towards law and
legal institutions, which some public or some part of the public holds.”61
‘[B]y “legal culture” is meant those historically conditioned, deeply rooted
attitudes about the nature of law and about the proper structure and operation of a
legal system that are at large in the society.’62
‘[C]ulturalists essentially contend that legal rules are embedded in local
dimensions of the law. Each legal culture is a unique, culturally contingent
product, which is incommensurable and untranslatable except through a deep
understanding of the surrounding social context.’63
Much of the cultural studies of law movement has been an effort to shift the
location at which we study law from the opinions of the appellate courts to the
expressions of ordinary people carrying out the tasks of everyday life.64
‘[T]he creation of legal meaning—‘jurisgenesis’—takes place always through an
essentially cultural medium.’65
While not defined explicitly as legal culture, comparatist Ed Eberle describes what is
otherwise legal culture:
‘[N]ot all external law is written. A second, deeper part of law lies beneath the
surface and is less visible. These are the underlying forces that operate within a
society to help form and influence law and give it substance. We might call this
59

Barbara Yngvesson, ‘Inventing Law in Local Settings: Rethinking Popular Legal Culture’, (1989) 98 YALE LJ 16891709, 1690(citation omitted)
60

Kahn (fn 49) 162.

61

Lawrence M. Friedman, ‘The Concept of Legal Culture: A Reply’, in David Nelken (ed.), Comparative Legal
Cultures (Aldershot: Dartmouth 1997) 33-40, 34.
62

Merryman (fn 33) 51.

63

Brand (fn 42) 428.

64

Kahn (fn 49) 155.

65

Robert M. Cover, ‘Foreword: Nomos and Narrative’, (1983) 97 Harvard LR 4-68, 11.
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the "invisible" dimension of law. Not that this dimension is wholly unknown or
unrecognizable, but more that this dimension of law is one we tend to assume,
take for granted, or perceive just dimly. Or we might think of these invisible
patterns as underlying crypto types-" the pattern to be revealed - or legal
formants-" non-verbalized rule[s]" - or "implicit patterns." Or we might think of
this dimension as "substructural, often unarticulated, categorizations. . . ." We
might refer to this dimension of law as internal: forces that operate beneath the
surface of external law, but which infuse the law with meaningful content.’66
Clearly the concept of legal culture has a rich and long history in the literature, and yet
may be thought to fall short in fully explaining the concept in a tangible and manageable
fashion.
In this article, as was employed in the related case study articles, a more simple and
functional definition, grounded in comparative law, will be offered. Namely that legal
culture is defined:
to consist of those characteristics present in a legal system, reflecting the common
history, traditions, outlook and approach of that system. Those characteristics may
be reflected in the actions or behaviours of the actors, organizations, and even of
the substance of the system. Legal culture exists not because of regulation of
substantive law, but as a result of the collective response and actions of those
participants in the legal system. As a result, legal culture can vary dramatically
from country to country, even when the countries share a common legal tradition.
Critically, legal culture is also to be found within international organizations and
fields—for they too are legal systems. Those different legal cultures are critical
for understanding the legal systems, for different legal cultures tell different
stories,67 see the world differently, and project different visions.68
But, legal culture should also be differentiated from legal traditions and legal systems.
Legal systems are “the composite of the legal organizations, rules, laws, regulations, and
legal actors of specific political units--usually states or sub-state entities[- - and] have
largely the same characteristics[,] the same rules and organizations.”69 Legal traditions, in
contrast, are:
‘[f]amilies of legal systems, sometimes . . . legal models or patterns . . [but] a
legal tradition is not a synonym for the history or development of law in a given
country[, r]ather, it is the aggregate of development of legal organizations (in the

66

Edward J. Eberle, ‘The Methodology of Comparative Law’, (2011) 16 ROGER WILLIAMS ULR 51-72, 63 (citations
omitted).
67

See Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law (Harvard University Press, Harvard 1987) at 8.

68

See Picker (China) (fn 8) 72-73 (citations omitted).

69

Colin B. Picker, ‘International Law’s Mixed Heritage: A Common/Civil Law Jurisdiction’, (2008) 41 VANDERBILT J
Transnational L 1093-1140, 1094 (hereinafter “Picker (International)”).
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broadest sense of the term) in a number of countries sharing some fundamental
similarities in the law.’70
Thus, one can see that while similar, and often confused and at times interchangeable in
some comparative analyses, the critical issue that differentiates a comparative legal
cultural analysis is that legal culture is more informal, subconscious, and typically tied to
just one system’s legal actors. In contrast legal systems are more formal and their
characteristics are consciously created and applied, while legal traditions normally
typically describe broad groupings and more typically reflect formal sources of law.
Perhaps most critically, in contrast to the concept of legal traditions, legal culture reflects
the “living law” in one legal system or community, focusing on the behaviour of the
participants. Legal traditions may set the environmental factors for those participants, but
how those participants behave within those legal settings is a matter of legal culture, not
legal tradition, though legal tradition may play a role in shaping that legal culture.
Indeed, as Erhard Blankenburg notes “[t]he comparison of Dutch and German legal
institutions has shown that similarities of formal legal systems are bad predictors of how
legal cultures actually work.”71 A similar example showing the lack of congruence
between tradition and culture are the very different legal cultures in England and the
United States—both members of the Common Law tradition.
Thus, legal systems belong to overarching legal traditions, while legal cultures exist
within, and sometimes across, legal systems, completely or partially within the
overarching legal traditions. There are legal cultures associated with legal traditions,
geographic regions, legal systems, legal fields, and even associated with communities,
large and small. For example, we can talk about the legal culture of the Socialist legal
tradition, of Western Europe, of the WTO, of international investment law, of France, of
family law, of the Amish community, or even of the Hell’s Angels. The discussion of
those legal cultures will be different, varying at each level, likely to be more generalized,
diffuse and vague for the larger bodies or fields, yet likely to be very specific and detailed
for the smaller focused communities or fields. But, whatever the legal or geographic
jurisdiction to which the legal culture applies, it will be the case that the legal culture
resides in the conscious and subconscious behaviours and attitudes of the many different
participants within that jurisdiction—from clients to lawyers, from judges to jurors, from
citizens to politicians, from bike gang leader to family law professors.
It should be noted, however, that complete legal cultures should be differentiated from
the more specific legal cultural characteristics found within those legal cultures, and
which comprise the data in most comparative legal cultural analyses. It is the latter
therefore, the legal cultural characteristics, which are typically at issue in those
analyses—the heart of this article’s proposal. After all, it is rare for an entire legal
culture to be in opposition to another legal culture or to an international policy initiative.
70

Ugo Mattei, ‘The Art and Science of Critical Scholarship: Postmodernism and International Style in the Legal
Architecture of Europe’, (2001) 75 Tulane LR 1053-1091. (text at fn 68) (citations omitted).
71

Blankenburg (fn 58) 39.
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The relevant issues are thus the specific legal cultural characteristics within the larger
legal culture. Legal cultures as a whole would typically be too large, amorphous and
unwieldy to be very helpful when considered in the aggregate. Nonetheless, there may
sometimes be benefit to considering a legal culture in the aggregate, such as when
considering the overall fit of one legal system with another. Because legal cultures in the
aggregate are not discussed in detail in the remainder of this article, a brief description of
such an aggregate legal culture may be helpful (in addition, as the discussion below
shows, the examination quickly devolves to consideration of specific legal cultural
characteristics). For that example, as it is the American legal system that is often
portrayed as being the outlier in international law,72 this article will briefly discuss that
aggregated legal culture as a concrete, albeit generalized example of a legal culture.
Regardless of its utility or accuracy, we can speak of the legal culture that exists as a
general matter across the entire United States—as an overlay under which the many legal
subcultures are found and through which the American legal system operates. But, that
legal culture is really just an aggregation of the many different, sometimes contradictory,
sometimes connected, legal cultural characteristics found throughout the United States
(thus, once again, it is necessary to return to specific legal cultural characteristics). The
American legal culture may be said to include, among many others, the following legal
cultural characteristics: individualism; pragmatism; parochialism; localism; nationalism;
exceptionalism; messianism; legal minimalism; public participation; legal scepticism;
legal realism; market force orientation; positivism; religious overtones; constitutional
cultism; instrumentalism; utilitarianism; extreme adversarialism; and so on.73 The extent
and depth of these legal cultural characteristics is, of course, debatable. While, many of
them may be found in other legal cultures, it is the aggregate of these and other American
legal cultural characteristics that comprises the American legal culture.
Furthermore, in keeping with the definition of legal culture, those characteristics are not
mandated by the formal parts of the American legal system or by the legacy of the
common law tradition. After all, statute, regulations, case law, or the overarching legal
tradition are not the determinates of a legal culture, though they may reflect and influence
the legal culture and hence may help to maintain that legal culture. For example, in
America the rules of discovery create the conditions for the abusive discovery that has
become a part of the American legal cultural landscape, yet those rules do not mandate
that sort of behaviour.74 The legal culture leads to those patterns of behaviour. In other
words, that American legal culture is not instilled through formal means—through
regulation or other official means. In significant respects, it is transmitted through
American popular culture and through the American people’s collective observations of
72

See, e.g., Colin B. Picker, ‘Reputational Fallacies in International Law: A Comparative Review of United States and
Canadian Trade Actions’, (2004) 30 Brooklyn J Intl L 67-116.
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These observed legal cultural characteristics are based on my experiences in America as a law student, judicial clerk,
attorney and as an academic, teaching American law (in America and overseas). See also, Kimberlianne Podlas,
‘Homerus Lex: Investigating American Legal Culture Through the Lens of the Simpsons’, (2007) 17 Seton Hall J
Sports & Entertainment L 93-133 (humorous but very insightful examination of American legal culture).
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See, e.g., U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26 et seq.; see especially Rule 26(b)(2)(C) (rules suggesting
limits when abusive).
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the way members of the public and the legal profession behave and respond to legal
issues. The professionals within the legal system are further exposed to the overarching
legal culture during their legal education and subsequent legal practice. Thus, American
law students early on “pick up” that there is an expectation, not mandated by law, that as
practitioners they will provide free, pro bono, legal service to worthy causes.75 Similarly,
once in practice, new American lawyers find out that despite stringent state bar rules to
the contrary, they can be expected as a de facto matter to practice the law of other state
jurisdictions—to be “American” and not just local lawyers.76 Thus, legal culture while
highly informal can be very powerful in creating the “living law” of a legal system.
Though not the subject of this article, considerations of the American legal culture as a
whole and its fit with the legal culture of international law or its subparts could be a
fruitful line of inquiry. But, that consideration will have to wait for another day. This
article is concerned with developing and explaining a methodology that deals with
international legal cultural conflicts that may arise between legal cultural characteristics
of different legal systems, including international legal systems such as that of IEL.

V COMPARATIVE LEGAL CULTURAL ANALYSIS
Comparative legal cultural analysis is the crux of this proposal. Put simply, a legal
cultural analysis of a legal system or community involves identifying those legal cultural
characteristics which play a significant role in the development of that legal system or
community, both internally and, in its comparative flavour, in its interactions with outside
legal systems and/or communities.
In considering the non-mandated behaviours of legal participants, comparative legal
cultural analysis overlaps to some extent with some other realist legal analyses, including
“socio-legal” analyses, such as that undertaken by Moshe Hirsch.77 There may also be
some overlap with legal anthropology, especially when the legal cultural analysis is more
descriptive.78 While the comparative legal cultural analysis suggested in this article is not
ethnography, it is nonetheless akin to those analyses that seek a “thick description” of the
relationship between culture and law.79 A “thick description” gives
‘[a] complex account of the slippage between the production and reception of law
and legal meanings, of the ways in which specific cultural practices or identities
75

See, e.g., Leslie C. Levin, ‘Pro Bono Publico in a Parallel Universe: The Meaning of Pro Bono in Solo and Small
Law Firms’, (2009) 37 Hofstra LR 699-734, 703.
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Arthur F. Greenbaum, ‘Multijurisdictional Practice and the Influence of Model Rule of Professional Conduct 5.5 -An Interim Assessment’, (2010) 43 Akron LR 729-768.
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See, e.g., Moshe Hirsch, ‘The Sociology of International Economic Law’, (2008) 19 European J Intl L 277-299.
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See Naomi Mezey, ‘Law as Culture’, in Austin Sarat and Jonathan Simon (eds.), Cultural Analysis, Cultural Studies,
and the Law: Moving Beyond Legal Realism (Duke University Press, Duhram and London 2003) 37-72, 58.
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See Clifford Geertz, ‘Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture’, in Clifford Geertz, The
Interpretation of Culture: Selected Essays (1973) (Basic Books, New York 1973).
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coincide or collide with specific legal rules or conventions thereby altering the
meaning of both.’80
But, in this article legal culture it is not used just in a thick descriptive or thin interpretive
manner, as is the case in cultural anthropology.81 The goal here is additionally the
eventual application and utility of the underlying law related to the legal cultures at issue
as well as examination of the real world interactions between legal systems and their
participants. Thus, this article focuses not just on legal culture and its role in legal
conflicts and disputes, but also on the relationship of legal culture with the other tangible
work of the law, from transactions to the creation of international economic realities in
trade, investment or other IEL fields.
Furthermore, the comparative legal cultural analyses suggested in this article is not the
same as these other methodologies for there will be a greater connection to comparative
law within the analyses, which would not have been the case for these other
methodologies. A few comparative examples of legal culture and its relationship to
different parts of the international economic legal order may help illustrate the point.
For example, the manner in which disputes have been resolved between the members of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations very strongly reflects certain common legal
cultural characteristics, such as “‘finessing’ and ‘defusing’” being “preferred to
adversarialism and confrontation”.82 The reference to adversarialism can immediately tie
into many concepts within comparative law,83 thus leading to numerous additional
insights related to those legal cultural characteristics and legal systems and institutions.
Similarly, the litigiousness of a state, a key legal cultural characteristic, has been found to
be reflected in the state’s tendency to file cases at the WTO.84 Litigiousness has been
examined extensively in comparative law85 and employing the lessons from those
examinations can lead to insights relevant to that legal cultural characteristic and used to
expand our understanding of that legal culture and the WTO.
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See Mezey (fn 78) 54.
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(the University of Chicago Press, Chicago 1999) (hereinafter “Kahn (Book)”) 91-127.
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(Edward Elgar Pub 2011) 150-182, 178.
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Nonetheless, legal cultural analyses are difficult and awkward—hence their general
absence from IEL research. Indeed, despite the existence of numerous attempts to define
and categorize legal culture, examples of which were provided earlier in this article, there
remains a great deal of scepticism about the concept, even outside of the international and
IEL context. Roger Cotterrell, for example, notes that: “the imprecision of these
formulations makes it hard to see what exactly the concept covers and what the
relationship is between the various elements said to be included within its scope.”86 But,
Cotterrell concedes that it is nonetheless useful “for its emphasis on the sheer complexity
and diversity of the social matrix in which contemporary state legal systems exist.”87 Of
course, legal culture analysis shares many of the same vagueness problems as exists with
studies involving culture in general. As Oscar Chase notes: “The principal difficulties
spring from the inherent vagueness of the concept, its potentially misleading message of
immutability of practice and belief, and its failure to acknowledge individual departures
from, and even opposition to, a social orthodoxy”.88 Chase then does acknowledge that
“these problems do not trump the utility of the concept of culture as a short-hand way of
acknowledging commonalities in practices, values, symbols and beliefs of groups of
people that form some sort of collectivity.”89
In addition, comparative legal cultural analyses may also be subject to many of the same
criticisms frequently levelled at other contextual approaches within comparative
methodology. Those contentious could potentially chill the application of the
methodology outside its usual arena.90 But, those disagreements are often not relevant
outside the very academic arguments in which they are found and generally not relevant
to the very real world practical applications of comparative legal cultural analyses. As an
initial matter, comparative legal cultural analyses must confront the post modern critique
that true comparative law is not possible due to the fact that comparatists cannot escape
their own legal culture in order to sufficiently “enter” that of another legal system.91 After
all, “a valid examination of another legal culture requires immersion into the political,
historical, economic and linguistic contexts that moulded the legal system, and in which
the legal system operates.”92 But, whether impossible or not with respect to comparative
analyses of domestic legal systems, the overall subject of the methodology proposed in
this article is an international legal system—IEL. Immersion into a field of international
law is not generally contemplated by those comparatists arguing this issue and may not
even be relevant to the discussion! After all, international law fields occupy a space
across all legal systems and are everywhere, including within the many different
86

Roger Cotterrell, ‘The Concept of Legal Culture’, in David Nelken (ed.), Comparing Legal Cultures (Aldershot,
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domestic legal systems. They are fundamentally different to the geographically and
politically bounded domestic systems typically considered by those seeking immersion
into a foreign legal culture. To the extent international legal fields and institutions
include a legal culture, which this article does indeed suggest, then those legal cultures
are not closed, but open to participants from all systems equally, with each contributing
to the formation of the legal culture of the international institution or field. As such, the
outsider comparatist has the ability to immerse herself into the subject legal culture as
easily as any of the many different participants from the numerous different domestic
legal systems that participate in the institution or field. True, there are factors, accessible
to all with sufficient preparation, that will assist in that immersion. They include
language, educational and professional experiences, legal tradition background and so
on—all factors that should be considered by a researcher when embarking on a
comparative legal cultural analysis of an international field or institution. Of course,
when analysing the legal culture of any relevant domestic systems, legal cultural analysis
does enter the terrain governed by the “inability to immerse” critique. But, because the
comparative legal cultural analysis is not intended to understand or analyse the complete
domestic legal systems at issue, the issue of incomplete immersion is perhaps not as
present, certainly not present to such a degree to rule out the analysis. Furthermore,
because multiple domestic legal systems may be relevant to the international legal system
under examination, full immersion into all of them is perhaps an unattainable goal outside
the context of a vast team of researchers all working together. Hence, while the critique
should be noted and taken into account as much as possible, it cannot stand as an obstacle
if comparative legal cultural analyses are to be undertaken.
Like comparative law methodologies in general, comparative legal cultural analysis must
be able to respond to post-modernist critiques. The proposed methodology does not fit
well with the extreme positions found among some of the post-modernists, such as those
associated with epistemic and moral relativism positions.93 Rather, this work may best fit
with the post-post modernists within comparative law.
‘[A] post-post-modernist approach to comparative law will retain the (self)critical impetus of the post-modernist critique, reject the postmodernist assertion
that objectivity is not attainable in comparative law, and synthesise old and new
demands for interdisciplinarity and thoughtful hermeneutics.’94
Nonetheless, the methodology is generally not concerned with the validity or otherwise
of one comparative methodology over another. It can operate within the assumption that
the traditional, modern and post-modern methodologies and bases of comparative law,
especially that of functionalism, are important and insightful approaches.
Similarly, the methodology proposed here does not need to be considered alongside or
within the arguments concerning the impossibility of legal transplantation, a position well
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argued by Pierre Legrande in numerous works.95 As an initial matter, the methodology is
not primarily concerned with the transplantation of law from one domestic system to
another. Rather, here the concern is with the relationships between international law,
international organizations and domestic legal systems—but only insofar as that domestic
law is relevant to the international organization, the international law, or the domestically
implemented international law. Nonetheless, transplantation is relevant to some aspects
of the article, but the fact that legal cultural analyses are involved serves to mitigate
Legrande’s critique of the typical academic discussions of transplantation. His essential
argument is that transplantation efforts are inherently flawed, for imported law that is
itself culturally anchored to a foreign system cannot be imported into a legal system that
is itself also intrinsically linked to a necessarily different context.96 But, the very issues
that Legrande raises, are the very issues examined here even as they may be absent in the
typical works involving legal transplantation. As such, there is no need for the article to
confront Legrande’s critique, for that critique is already a part of the very fabric of the
article.
Comparative law can be difficult and rife with substantive, methodological and
theoretical pitfalls. For the most part, the debates about methodology within comparative
law are simply not relevant to the methodology proposed in this article. But, because of
the definitional and vagueness issues, legal culture analyses can still be awkward and
misunderstood, and consequently ignored or minimized within the already contentious
and difficult comparative law. It is thus no surprise that comparative and legal cultural
analyses are hardly applied outside the usual domestic legal system subjects that form the
primary arena of comparative law. As such, this article’s application of comparative and
comparative legal cultural analyses to an international law field, IEL, pushes the bounds
of those methodologies.
VI. COMPARATIVE AND LEGAL CULTURAL ANALYSIS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
Trachtman rightly notes that “each research method has a domain in which it is
illuminating. Outside that domain, it may be misleading.”97 But, the domain of
comparative law methodologies can, as this article seeks to show, be extended to include
international fields. Indeed, some scholars at the micro level have with some success
employed aspects of comparative law to examine discreet areas of international law.98
Though, for the most part, scholars either ignore or fail to use comparative methodologies
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to examine international law fields—especially at a macro level.99 But, it is possible—
and potentially fruitful. For example, one of the background works to this article
provided a unique comparative analysis of public international law as a whole.100 That
examination approached international law through the classic western comparative law
taxonomy, identifying common and civil law characteristics that exist within
international law. It came to the conclusion that public international law is
predominantly a mix of characteristics that derive from the civilian and common law
traditions, and furthermore that the nature of the mix bears substantial similarity to those
jurisdictions known as “mixed jurisdictions”.101 That conclusion suggests that the
ongoing development of public international law may benefit from consideration of how
the similar mixed jurisdictions have successfully handled the mix of common and civil
law components of their legal systems.
Nonetheless, despite the utility of such works there is scepticism within the public
international law field that comparative law drawn from the domestic arena is relevant to
what is often considered to be the unique international law system.102 Even aside from
any notions of uniqueness, international law research tends to shy away from
comparative law methodologies.103 An uncharitable explanation could be that it is due in
part to international law’s parochial and superior nature.104 Indeed, while referring to
domestic systems, and there is little to suggest it is not as applicable to international
systems, Karl Llewellyn noted that:
“[N]owhere more than in law do you need armor against . . . ethnocentric and
chronocentric snobbery-the smugness of [one’s] own tribe and [one’s] own time:
We are the Greeks, all others are barbarians.”105
As such, international law research will too often see little value in domestic legal
systems—despite the clear domestic law heritage of much of international law.106
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If there has been little use of comparative law methodologies within general international
law research it should not then be surprising that the relatively more hard-nosed
economics-based field of IEL also typically fails to utilize comparative law
methodologies.107 Also, comparative legal cultural analyses, the methodology suggested
here, as a more difficult and unusual comparative method, is even more rarely considered
within international law.108 While sometimes noted,109 it is rarely considered in depth,
despite research that points to the need for such legal cultural analyses.110
But, the blame for the lack of comparative and comparative legal cultural analyses of
international law, to the extent blame is relevant, cannot just be laid at the feet of
international law researchers. Comparatists have also been reluctant to apply themselves
to international issues.111 Indeed, traditional comparative analyses are often attacked “for
isolationism vis-á-vis related legal subjects (such as jurisprudence or international law)
and for lack of interdisciplinary efforts” and “for persistent Eurocentrism and obsession
with private law; as well as for lack of attention to international regimes”.112 Though
there are some efforts, especially within the last few years, when comparatists have
tackled international law issues, most often those works relate to those times when
international and national have concurrent jurisdiction.113 But, it is clear that there is a
need for more comparatists to consider international law fields and institutions, and
within their comparative analyses to apply some of the less traditional methodologies,
such as comparative legal cultural analyses.114 Though, it should be noted that even
within comparative law’s consideration of domestic systems, legal cultures are not
always formally acknowledged. After all, legal cultural analyses has often been carried
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out “sub silentio”, without explicit methodological exposition.115 Though this may have
been more the case in the previous generation of comparatists. Vivian Curran argues that
the “elder statesmen” of American comparative law, as émigrés from Europe, “[b]eing of
two countries, and sometimes more, the comparatist scholars of the last generation
understood that translating from one legal discourse to another requires an understanding
of the respective legal cultures.”116 Today’s generation less typically has that innate
understanding. Though, in some ways we cannot fault comparative (and international
law scholars) for their failure to use legal cultural analyses, for legal academics in general
have themselves been “relative latecomers to cultural analysis and cultural studies” .117
Despite the general failure to consider legal culture within the legal academy,
comparatists should know better, for they are confronted with it more often and starkly
than is likely the case for legal academics focused within domestic legal systems. Indeed,
Nora Demleitner has noted that while “the original purpose of comparative law was to
facilitate European cross-border trade through a comparison of legal rules, today it can
assist in mediating conflicts that may arise from the cross border movement of persons
who are imbued with the values of the legal culture into which they were born [and] can
reveal how another person perceives the world, and how law contributes to and reflects
the culture of a country.”118 Clearly, comparative law can go further and extend into
helping international legal regimes handle their interactions with domestic systems and
peoples with different legal cultures. Demleitner further suggests the employment for
human rights research of a methodology such as that proposed in this article, and says
that if it were to be done then “comparative law could finally also live up to its promise
and goal of becoming “a worldwide legal discipline” .119
Having established that the methodology could and should be applied to research on
international economic law, it remains to show how it could actually be implemented in
practice. At a concrete level, that implementation or application of the methodology will
be carried out by the three different groups of legal participants within international
economic law—IEL scholars, practitioners, and officials. While there will be some
overlap, generally speaking each of those groups will apply the methodology in different
ways and in different contexts. As an initial matter, scholars are more likely to explicitly
resort to the methodology, generally having the time and incentive to consider and
present their methodological approaches. Not typically having pressing client or
115
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institutional demands on their research, scholars will more often than the other groups
have the luxury of considering and apply different methodological approaches to the
issues they are examining. Furthermore, due to the nature of the final product they
produce, explicit presentation of their methodological approach is more likely than that in
litigation or international organization legal documents. Furthermore, that application,
divorced as it is from concrete or live disputes, can delve more deeply and into the more
esoteric aspects of the legal cultural disconnects that may exist across and within the
field. For example, the author is in the process of undertaking a scholarly analysis of the
attitudes to the field of IEL scholars in communities with strong present and historic
connections to Confucianism, such as those of China, Vietnam, Singapore, Hong Kong,
Korea, and Taiwan. That project involves a carefully constructed and implemented
survey of IEL scholars in those “Confucian” communities, attempting to tease out any
different approaches to IEL that may be related to overt or subconscious legal cultural
attitudes that may be related to Confucianism.120 For example, identification of a greater
role for “virtue” in approaches and expected goals of IEL fields and institutions among
those scholars might lend support to the idea that Confucianism is playing a role in their
legal culture and in their understandings of and work within IEL. Of course, such studies
are difficult and complex, and may often lead to inconclusive results. But, to the extent
insights and useable results do emerge, they will be very important in the understanding
and development of the field, particularly if for that project the study is extended to IEL
officials from those societies.
While scholars have the luxury of being able to engage in detailed contemplations of the
field, practitioners are forced to respond to the legal cultural issues that arise in the
context of servicing clients in such areas as transnational disputes and transactions.
Whenever there are dispute settlement proceedings and transactions involving
participants from different legal cultures there is no question that identifying and
understanding the legal cultural pressure points will be of great value. For example, in
the international investment arbitration context, Jan Paulson recently discussed this very
issue, noting the fact that “skilled advocates need to be attuned to the culture of the
arbitrators they face is self-evident; it is an obvious and essential element of the
internationally active advocate’s credibility and persuasiveness.”121 Paulson also noted
the critical need to understand the legal culture of the advocates on the other side of a
dispute, both with respect to their legal cultural behaviours within the arbitral hearings,
but also outside those hearings.122 In significant part, practitioners learn, often through
trial and error, how to navigate these legal cultural minefields through successive
interactions with arbitrators and advocates from different legal cultural backgrounds. By
knowing to look for legal cultural influences within the procedural and substantive law of
the different fields and institutions within IEL, practitioners gain an advantage over those
120
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that do not include such analysis in their work. For example, such advantage can be
gained through the appropriate presentation of legal sources and authorities, such as the
correct weight to be given to principles and treatises before arbitrators from a civilian
legal culture.123 Similarly, understanding that counsel from common law jurisdictions
may have an irrational attachment to their forms of civil procedure can be helpful when
negotiating a compromis.124 While not usually dispositive, the small gains may be
sufficient to tilt the balance in favour of the party employing the legal cultural analysis,
just as those skilled in private international law have an advantage over opposition less
skilled in choice of law analysis.
Governmental and international organization officials will also find legal cultural
analyses helpful, both within proceedings, similarly to practitioners, and also as they seek
to develop the law, similarly to scholars. Additionally, due to the cosmopolitan nature of
international organizations, both international organization officials and the member
states delegation officials of those organizations must navigate a complex mix of legal
cultures—within the organization among the different individuals that work there as well
as within the resultant substantive and procedural law of the organization. Thus, an
American government official working at the WTO in Geneva, will often work with
officials from the other delegations as well as with the WTO’s officials, who are
themselves very likely to reflect the legal cultures of their home jurisdictions.125
Furthermore, all those officials must learn to work with a substantive and procedural law
that is likely to reflect the numerous legal cultural heritages of those involved in the
creation and development of the organization. Of course, like practitioners, through
experience official should be able to learn to look out for the legal cultural conflicts that
must inevitably arise within such organizations. But, there is a risk that the legal cultural
issues will be subconsciously ignored, under the misapprehension that legal culture is an
issue for domestic law alone, and not present within the international legal order.126
Greater explicit consideration of legal culture and comparative legal cultural analyses
will help to counter that fallacy. Finally, for international organizations there are also
important internal institutional applications of the methodology that are less present for
scholars and practitioners.127 Employment of legal cultural analysis will help to reveal
legal cultural influences within the international organization, influences that may not
always be in the best or long term interest of the organization or field. For example, a
strong common law legal cultural influence may undermine the acceptability of the
organization and its law with non-common law systems, the majority in the world, and
may impede implementation within those non-common law systems.128
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Even after each of the above different IEL participants commits to employing legal
cultural analyses, they are then faced with the difficulties associated with the application
of this methodology that spans the two typically separate fields of international and
comparative law. Furthermore, because comparative legal cultural analyses focus on
behaviour and sociological indicators, IEL legal actor participants will need to learn to
think differently. While still important, the traditional doctrinal approaches to sources of
law, processes and institutions may need to be supplemented with the more nuanced and
often behaviourist approach that will often be associated with comparative legal cultural
analyses. In addition, because different legal cultures will be at issue, comparative law
considerations may be more central. Those comparative considerations might include
traditional comparative methodological approaches to employment of the substantive
content of comparative law—its attention to the legal classifications and the differing
legal approaches within the many different major and sometimes minor traditions and
systems. It may be that trained and expert comparatists will need to be involved, both for
their knowledge and their approaches. If nothing else, it should become clear to IEL
legal participants that excessive specialization that does not include comparative law may
not be the best approach for operating in an increasingly interconnected field.

VII. CONLUSION
While the proposal in this article is not nearly so grand or momentous, an apt analogy
that helps to convey the contribution of the article to the field would be when the
telescope which had only been used to see distant objects at sea or on land was improved
by Galileo, permitting him to turn it on the night sky for the first time. That new use
revealed that the Milky Way was composed of stars, that the surface of the moon had
craters and mountains, and that Jupiter had moons.129 While that early telescope did not
provide many answers, it raised new and important questions and provided insights into
our understandings of the Earth, the night sky and the universe. Similarly, while many
answers are not provided by this article, novel insights are illuminated that will lead to
new questions and lines of inquiry, and eventually, through later similar studies, will lead
to greater understandings of the international legal order.
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